Corrupt Conduct

Transparency, Norms and Trust

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Introduction

Democratic systems are unable to operate without the active engagement of the population. According to Robert Dahl, an ideal democracy fulfils several criteria[7]. Interestingly, all stress the importance of civil engagement. Elected politicians rely on active citizenship. Dahl's interpretation makes clear why transparency is an important institutional design (Hood & Heald, 2006, p.211). It engages society in the democratic process, as accessible information gives them the opportunity to have a say.

Democracy can not only be discussed as a political system, but also as a cultural space. Democratic cultures rely on certain types of behaviours which are guided by 'positive' norms, for example a sense of responsibility. Transparency supposedly helps endorse these norms. It has also been advocated as a way to fight against undemocratic cultures, such as corruption[8]. It is argued that it replaces 'negative' undemocratic norms with 'positive' ones. This chapter focuses on the question as to whether, and to what extent, transparency promotes 'positive' norms and trust in one country, Mozambique, which is affected by a high degree of corruption. Corruption is understood as the abuse of public office for private gain (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p.522). The question engages with two points of view. Dominique Bessire stipulates that transparency undermines norms and trust as it depicts individuals as calculating and opportunistic (Bessire, 2005, p.428). For her, transparency constrains individual freedoms, and is thus essentially amoral and unethical (p.430). For Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig (2009), transparency introduces 'positive' norms as it fosters cooperation and trust (p.529). It establishes a sense of responsibility and a willingness to be open.

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7   Robert Dahl's five criteria; 1) effective participation; 2) voting equality; 3) enlightened understanding; 4) control of the agenda; 5) inclusiveness (Li, 2000)

8   Transparency International's motto is "the global coalition against corruption" (Transparency International II, 2012)

The chapter focuses on Mozambique and its extractive industries. Mozambique was chosen for several reasons. First, the country has a young democracy. Following spells of colonialism and civil war, institutions have recently been subjected to transparency initiatives. For this reason, Mozambique provides a perfect study to explore whether transparency promotes 'positive' norms and trust where previously there was none. Second, corruption in Mozambique's extractive industries complicates the process of democratisation. Mozambique's resources are largely unexploited and future profiteering has the potential to make Mozambique economically strong. The country has recently enacted laws and joined the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives[9] (EITI) making changes in behaviour, norms and trust apparent. Finally, Mozambique's society provides an interesting case. As transparency, norms and trust involve the participation of government and society, the latter's composition is key to how these concepts are established. Mozambican society is very diverse, accommodating many fault lines. For example, politically, it is divided between the two major political parties, *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO). Theoretically, the implementation of transparency initiatives mends these fault lines as it advocates trust and promotes 'positive' norms.

The chapter uses several sources, focusing on academic literature and ethnographic studies. The former is used to discuss concepts such as transparency, norms and trust. Ethnographic examinations, such as the one conducted by Grobbelaar and Lala, allow this chapter to provide adequate background information on Mozambique. Moreover, deliberations from Non Governmental Organisations (NGO), such as Transparency International (TI) and the *Centro De Integridade Publica*[10] are used to delve into the issue of norms and trust. Data gained from TI's Corruption Perception Index and Corruption Barometer and the centre's interview allows the chapter to place itself at the core of the issue.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, key concepts are defined and elaborated on. Moreover, the ideas of Bessire and Kolstad and Wiig are elaborated. Second, Mozambique and its extractive industries are introduced. The focus is on natural resources and corruption, transparency, and norms and trust. Third, the data gathered from the case study is analysed in light of the views of Bessire and Kolstad and Wiig. Lastly, the chapter will come to a conclusion.

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9   The initiative attempts to limit corruption by making revenue collection in extractive industries transparent (Transparency International II, 2012).

10   The centre is a non-profit, independent organization whose mission it is to contribute towards the socio-economic and political development of Mozambique. It specifically deals with corruption in governance (Centre for Public Integrity, 2012).

Transparency, norms and trust

According to the Encyclopaedia of Democratic Thought, transparency is:

> *"(...) government according to fixed and published rules, on the basis of information and procedures that are accessible to the public, and (in some usages) within clearly demarcated fields of activity..."*
>
> *(Hood & Heald, 2006, p.5)*

Transparency is an institutional design for governance. It focuses on openness and the availability of information. It entails a variety of elements. On the one hand, publically accessible information is an outcome of transparency. It is a state in which governance is transparent. On the other hand, transparency also refers to a type of behaviour. For example, a government's willingness to publish information suggests transparent behaviour and openness. This chapter specifically focuses on accountability.

Norms are the rules which govern behaviour (Bicchieri & Muldoon, 2011). Dominant norms are established when they are seen as the 'normal' and are accepted by the majority of society. Norms are learned through socialisation. As well as dictating behaviour, norms are also simultaneously created and reinforced by behaviour. A change in behaviour signifies a change in a norm. According to the Oxford dictionary, trust is a "firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something" (Oxford Dictionaries, 2012). Trust in governance is the expectation that a government acts responsibly and for the welfare of its population.

Dominique Bessire and Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig

	Bessire	Kolstad and Wiig
'Positive norms'	Transparency assumes that individuals are calculating and opportunistic. It helps discipline behaviour but does not promote 'positive' norms.	Transparency disciplines behaviour which promotes 'positive' norms. It also fosters cooperation which stimulates a sense of responsibility to others.
Trust	Because transparency is linked to surveillance, it does not promote trust. Rather, it nourishes suspicion.	Information symmetry allows actors to elect non-corrupt officials to government, promoting trust and cooperation.

Dominique Bessire

Bessire notes that in contemporary discourse, transparency is assumed to reduce information asymmetry (Bessire, 2005, p.426). Information asymmetry is a situation in which one actor has more access to information than the other. Economic theories stipulate that individuals act in a corrupt manner when the risks of being caught are less than those of not being caught (Barr & Serra, 2006, p.4). Transparency increases the chances of getting caught as actions become visible to other actors. This makes corruption less attractive. Transparency is linked to information, and information is linked to power. Power is understood as a mechanism which can be apprehended by any individual and whose chief function is to train (Foucault, 1977, p.170). It brings to the fore five operations; 1) it refers the individual's actions to a field of comparison, 2) it differentiates individuals from each other, 3) it establishes an average, 4) it hierarchies in terms of abilities, and 5) it establishes an external frontier, "the shameful class", which is used as a comparison with other groups (pp.177-181). Power and discipline have the ability to 'normalise'.

Bessire believes that transparency does not promote 'positive' norms and trust. For her, proponents of transparency view individuals as calculating and opportunistic (Bessire, 2005, p.428). As transparency disciplines certain types of behaviour, it constrains individual's freedoms to choose. For her, without freedom, there is neither responsibility nor ethics. Ethics and morality are linked to norms. Norms are guided by morals which make a distinction between good and bad. Morality is made up of three areas; moral codes, actions, and ethics (Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2012). Moral codes are the values and norms recommended by 'prescriptive agencies' (Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2012). Actions are the behaviours exhibited by other actors (ibid.). Ethical conduct is the intentional action taken by the individual, in accordance to the other two areas. Individuals need to have the freedom to choose and bind themselves normatively to the moral codes (ibid.). Returning to Bessire, the constraints placed on individual's freedoms consequently make them disregard other's freedoms. In all, for Bessire transparency disciplines behaviours but does not promote 'positive' norms and trust.

Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig

Kolstad and Wiig have an optimistic view of transparency. Citing numerous reasons, they assert that transparency promotes 'positive' norms and trust. First, they claim that transparency makes corruption more risky and less attractive (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009, p.522). Information symmetry makes the conduct of officials open to public scrutiny, which makes corruption more detectable. Because of this, corruption becomes less attractive, promoting 'positive' norms and trust. Second, transparency makes it easier for society to

elect honest officials. Kolstad and Wiig assume that individuals would rather contact non-corrupt than corrupt officials (p.523). Information symmetry enables actors to be able to identify desirable candidates, which fosters cooperation. This leads to their third claim that, as transparency promotes cooperation, it increases trust. Information symmetry allows actors to coordinate their actions, increasing cooperation, and thus increasing trust (p.524). Moreover, as all actors depend on each other, a sense of responsibility towards each other is established.

Case Study: Mozambique

In order to provide an adequate overview of Mozambique, the following section is split in three. First, an investigation into Mozambique's natural resources is given. This entails an insight into the problem of corruption. Second, Mozambique's societal composition is discussed, as well as its fault lines. Third, with the use of an interview and a barometer, public perceptions and trust is assessed.

Natural resources and corruption

Mozambique has abundance in natural resources, ranging from oil to hydroelectricity. Compared to the rest of Africa, Mozambique's natural resources have not yet been fully explored. Normally, revenues from natural resources should stimulate the economy, as well as increase the welfare of the citizens. However, while Mozambique's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased by 7.2% in 2011, 54% of the population still live underneath the poverty line (CIA, 2012). Arguably, this is because Mozambique suffers from a high level of corruption. TI's Corruption Perception Index ranks Mozambique at 116 with a score of 2.7 (Transparency, 2012). Part of the problem, Mozambique's government is not sufficiently accountable to its citizens or to the law (USAID, 2005, p.iv).

Mozambique has made inroads into curbing corruption. One example is the adoption of Law (6/2004). The law applies to all individuals including political figures and the government. Numerous articles address different issues. Article 4 stipulates that all people holding decision making powers in State departments, local institutions, public companies and institutions, should submit a declaration of their assets (The President of the Republic, 2004, p.1). The declarations should include movable, fixed and semi-movable assets, cash shares and bonds held inside or outside of the country (idid.). By making such information accessible, interested stakeholders are able to assess the conduct of officials in the field of extractive resources. Furthermore, Article 10 states that any illegal financial gain is punishable with a prison sentence of two to eight years and a fine of up to one

year (p.5). The article discourages corruption as it clearly defines the punishment for non-compliance. However, the law does have several shortcomings. Although it covers passive and active bribery, the law does not cover other forms of corruption such as, among others, the diversion of funds or trafficking of influence (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). This means only one strand of corruption is addressed.

Mozambique has also made attempts to join the EITI. The initiative attempts to make extractive countries more transparent by making officials disclose revenues. According to the 2009 report, certain criterions were not met, including:

1.   *Indicator 9; there was no clear definition of "material payments and revenues"*
2.   *Indicator 11; not all entities that make or receive material payments were included*
3.   *Indicator 13; the audited accounts were not to international standards*
4.   *Indicators 14 and 15; not all material oil, gas and mining payments were included*

(Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 2012).

Mozambican officials do not seem to disclose its revenues properly, indicating that corruption remains. It becomes clear that although Mozambique is making strides towards transparency, hurdles still exist. Indeed, corruption persists. For example, a comparison between payments made by mining companies and government revenues suggested that the latter claimed it had received much less than the former stated (Martini, 2012, p.7). This suggests that corrupt officials took the difference of approximately 118,000 Euros (ibid.).

Mozambican Society

According to a 2007 census, there are around 20 million people living in Mozambique of which 5 million reside in the south and 15 million in the centre and north (Statoids, 2012). Ethnically, there are around 17 different ethnic groups (Grobbellar & Lala, 2003, p.12). Linguistically, Portuguese is the state's official language, but only 39.6% of the population is able to speak it (Grobbelaar & Lala, 2003, p.35). The other languages present are Emakhuwa, which is found mostly in the north and spoken by 26.4% of the population, and Xichangana and Elomwe spoken by 11.4% and 7.9% of the population respectively (ibid).

Geographic fault lines

Geographically (Annex 1), there is a clear divide between the north and centre and the south. This divide influences political, urban and economic divisions. For example, while the northern and central provinces are RENAMO strongholds, the southern provinces are dominated by FRELIMO (Grobellaar & Lala, 2003, p.11). This is a consequence of the

country's civil war. This division consequently impacts trust, as will be discussed in future sections. The geographic fault line is also partly a colonial legacy. Indeed, the country acted as a transport route for the vibrant British colonies to the Indian Ocean (p.12). As a consequence, the country's infrastructure was divided into three semi-autonomous economic regions, each consisting of trading routes from West to East. Today, there is still no highway linking the north and the south of the country (ibid.). This poses severe restrictions on communication. The fault line impacts social cohesion which is integral to the creation of civil society as it strengthens societal ties and responsibility to each other.

Ethnical and linguistic fault lines

Mozambicans are very hesitant to identify potential ethnic conflicts (ibid.). This is partly due to FRELIMO's policies in the 1970's and 1980's, whereby it attempted to create a socialist society where discrimination was taboo. Nevertheless, ethnicity does play a role in politics. Indeed, former President Joaquim Chissano, discussing the selection of the next FRELIMO leader, noted that the leader should come from the north of the country (ibid.). Similarly, RENAMO still enjoys much support from the central and northern belts because of its tribal affiliations with the Ndau group (ibid.). Ethnic fault lines impacts trust and social cohesion as the different groups do not feel that the other groups feel responsible to them. Furthermore, the lack of linguistic cohesiveness impacts social cohesion. Without a common language, diverse groups find it hard to interact with each other.

Trust, norms and public opinion

The following section uses data provided by *Centro De Integridade Publica* and TI's Global Corruption Barometer. Specifically, it focuses on the relationship between government and society. Perhaps most striking is that 56% of Mozambicans stated that corruption had increased in the last three years, compared to 21% who said that it had decreased (Annex 3). Moreover, only 41% said that governmental policies were ineffective while 32% said they were effective (ibid.). This appears to convey a pessimistic view of corruption in Mozambique. One of the reasons why there may have been an increase in corruption is because there is a lack of accountability and weak institutional provisions. Indeed, *Centro De Integridade Publica* highlights that public information is often hidden from the public, especially in the extractive industries (Annex 2). Moreover, the centre notes that there is at the moment a draft law on the access of information which has been deposited at the parliament for around ten years (annex 2). Even the government's 2010/11 Review on corruption perception has yet to be published (ibid.). Because civil society is weak and democratic institutions are not in place, there is no pressure for government officials to act. Indeed, corruption remains because of the half-hearted attempts to implement initiatives aimed at eradicating it.

Expanding on corruption in institutions, the Barometer indicates that the three most corrupt institutions[11] are the police (4.3), the education system (3.9) and public officials (3.7) (annex 3). Corruption in Mozambique is so extensive that Mozambicans also rate public institutions reasonably corrupt (3.4), although this number was similar to the global average of 3.3 (ibid.). When questioned which institution was the most trusted in fighting corruption, respondents chose the media (24%) followed by government leaders (21%), International organisations and NGO's (18%), nobody (11%) and last the private sector (9%) (ibid.). Here, the perceived presence of corruption in institutions appears to be linked to trust in fighting corruption. Indeed, the more corrupt institutions are perceived, the less society trusts the actor. This suggests a strong correlation between trust and 'positive' norms, such as responsibility.

Corruption in Mozambique is so extensive that it also manifests itself in society. According to the Barometer, 68% of Mozambicans had paid a bribe in the last twelve months (Annex 3). This was in comparison to the global average of 24%. Corruption culture is also likely to affect public participation. Indeed, in areas of public policy monitoring and accountability, civil society does not engage itself. Participation is often limited as it contradicts the view points of the government (annex 2). Related to trust, the centre also notes that because of the differences between the south and the north, the latter do not trust the government and thus are less likely to be engaged (ibid.). Despite this, Mozambicans appear to be very active in fighting against corruption. Indeed when asked if an ordinary citizen could make a difference in the fight against corruption 82% agreed compared to the global average of 70%. This figure is very high compared to institutional trust in fighting corruption. By placing less trust in other actor's actions, there appears to be an absence of trust.

Analysis: Transparency, norms and trust

The analysis Returns to the question at stake; that is whether, and to what extent, transparency promotes 'positive' norms and trust.

'Positive' norms
On the one hand, transparency promotes certain types of behaviours. For example, information symmetry gives civil society more power to shape the Mozambican

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11   1 being not at all corrupt and 5 being extremely corrupt.

government's conduct. The symmetry exists because officials are forced to disclose information regarding revenues. Indeed, Article 4 of Law (6/2004) clearly states that all revenues must be declared. Transparency, through reducing information asymmetry, also disciplines by bringing Foucault's power operations into play. TI's Corruption Perception Index and Barometer compares Mozambique to other countries and ranks Mozambique according to the perceived level of corruption. This categorises Mozambique as either democratic or undemocratic which consequently impacts attitudes towards the country. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may decide to halt its financial support, as Mozambique does not conform to its democratic criterion. This disciplines officials to disclose all revenues, and conduct business in a transparent manner. As well as information symmetry, other punishments also increase the costs of being corrupt. Indeed, Article 10 in Law (6/2004) specifically mentions that disobedience entails a prison sentence of two to eight years and a fine of up to one year. Knowing the consequences of being caught, corruption becomes less attractive for officials. Disciplining and punishing attempts to reinforce the norm through changing the behaviour.

However, although it does discipline behaviours, transparency does not promote 'positive' norms. This is evident when individuals, who are not sufficiently pressured, fail to comply with proposed initiatives. Indeed, although Law (6/2004) exists, its application is limited. Moreover, Mozambique also fails to fully comply with essential EITI criteria, most importantly with Indicators 9 and 11. *Centro De Integridade Publica* also notes that information is often hidden. The centre mentions two examples. One is that of a draft law on the access of information which has been in parliament for 10 years; and the other being the government's 2010/11 review on corruption not being published. Weak implementation is partly because of institutional absences. The judiciary system is weak and there is a lack of independent institutions which can check on the actions of officials. What becomes apparent is that although behaviour is disciplined, there is no willingness to be responsible towards society. It reinforces the view that transparency does not promote 'positive' norms. Advocates of transparency assume that government officials are calculating and opportunistic, and thus will not be open and responsible without external pressures. Transparency restricts the choices an official can make, forcing the individual to conform to a certain mould of governance. Here, morality is not promoted. Normatively, officials do not feel bound to a moral code. The disclosure of revenues becomes an obligation rather than a responsibility towards society.

Trust

At first glance, transparency enhances cooperation which seemingly increases trust between actors. Information symmetry allows actors to view each other's actions which

make cooperation more feasible. By being able to survey government conduct civil society is able to identify non-corrupt officials. Knowing that non-corrupt officials will provide for their welfare, civil society no longer feels the need to discipline certain types of behaviours. Consequently, this encourages society to trust elected politicians. In the case of Mozambique, the barometer shows that government leaders are the second most trusted individuals in fighting corruption. As trust relies on the perception of other actor's attitudes, it can only be truly established when 'positive' norms are present in the other's attitudes.

However, as this chapter finds that transparency does not promote 'positive' norms, it neither promotes trust. Instead, as transparency is linked with surveillance, it creates suspicion. Transparency does not promote trust for two reasons. First, transparency does not address the societal problems which influence trust. For example, *Centro De Integridade Publica* stresses that geography influences perceptions of government actions. The north and centre remain sceptical of government actions on the basis of sensitive historical and political divides. Transparency alone does not address such issues, such as post-civil war societies, as it is primarily interested in decreasing information asymmetry. As a result, parts of Mozambique's society do not trust their government to be responsible for them despite transparency initiatives. Linked, the second reason is that the government is not trusted because of the absence of 'positive' norms. Society does not feel that the government feels responsible to them. Their fears are well founded as shown by the alarming poverty rate. Government policies are seen as ineffective, and its institutions are seen as corrupt and are not trusted. Fearful that Mozambique's government neglects society, civil servants advocate transparency in order to force a particular behaviour. For this reason, transparency reinforces suspicion rather than develops trust. Suspicion implies the belief that something is wrong without actually having proof or evidence (Oxford Dictionaries II, 2012). Suspicion is found in areas where information asymmetry exists. As transparency is used as a means to reduce the asymmetry, it seeks to find proof of corruption. Law (6/2004) and the EITI criteria reiterates that transparency assumes that individuals are calculating and opportunistic. It highlights that when actors do not trust other actors to act in a responsible manner, initiatives which force behaviour are advocated.

Transparency, norms and trust revisited

This analysis shows that transparency has two effects concerning extractive industries and corruption. First, this chapter agrees with Bessire and Kolstad and Wiig as it finds that transparency changes corrupt behaviour. Indeed, individuals are disciplined through laws and initiatives. Information symmetry increases the risk of being caught, and therefore makes corruption less attractive. However, despite this, this chapter finds

that transparency does not promote 'positive' norms and trust. This supports the views of Bessire. First, individuals do not feel responsible to others. For this reason, corruption culture does not change. This is highlighted by the reported increase in corruption and numerous cases where essential obligations are neglected. Individuals only comply with the minimum of what is expected of them. Officials may disclose information about revenues, but as corruption culture continues, they seek other avenues for corruption. Because of transparency, individuals' freedom of choice is restricted as they are forced to behave in a certain manner. Therefore, although transparency promotes certain types of behaviours, it does not change corrupt culture.

Second, transparency does not promote trust but rather fosters suspicion. Transparency assumes that individuals are calculating and opportunistic. Advocating transparency implies that society feels that without constraints, politicians will not act in their interest. By creating a situation where there is information symmetry, civil society actively attempts to uncover signs of corruption. Trust cannot be established because cooperation is based on suspicion. Indeed, as transparency is a tool to discipline behaviour, it becomes apparent that actors feel they must exert control in order to guarantee their welfare. By restraining an individual's freedom to choose, they are likely to neglect other's freedoms. In order for there to be real trust, actors must be left to take their own decisions. Officials must see transparency as a responsibility towards the population rather than an obligation.

Despite this, it must be reiterated that transparency does promote desired types of behaviours and therefore remains a useful tool in combating corruption. Rather than abandoning transparency, its application should coincide with policy alternatives which compliment it. By accepting corruption as a culture, it is important to socialise rather than force 'positive' norms. In this way, rather than merely cutting the weeds, the roots are dug out. First, critical thinking must be promoted. Critical thinking is vital for the development of morals as it is needed for self-reflection. It allows individuals to differentiate between good and bad. Critical thinking can be promoted through having a strong education system, although it should be stressed that the system should not represent an extension of the state. An education can provide the tools for individuals to process information and to develop their own opinions. Media can also be used as a tool to develop critical thinking. A plurality of opinions allows individuals the freedom to choose and create their own. By developing critical thought, morals are established and trust and a responsibility to others fostered.

Second, in order for a sense of responsibility to be fostered, unity must be created. Unity is especially important in the case of extractive resources. Provided certain circumstances exist, Mozambique can establish herself as a strong African state. Unity can be developed through increasing cooperation but also through emphasising

common events and symbols, such as Mozambique's common struggle for independence. The Mozambican case study has shown how society is very much divided. The divides stem from Mozambique's violent and disruptive history. The country has not had time to develop a national identity. Another obvious means to creating unity is through stressing the need for a common language. As only 39.6% of the population speaks Portuguese, it excludes a large part of society from participating in checking government information. By improving the literacy rate, as well as providing the linguistic tools to read government publications, there may be greater incentive to engage in the democratic process, increasing cooperation. By developing a sense of unity, those officials handling the contracts and revenues will feel responsible for the rest of population. Therefore, it is hoped that they morally choose to disclose information.

Conclusion

This chapter questioned whether, and to what extent, transparency promoted 'positive' norms and trust. Specifically, it sought to position itself in between two opposing views. Bessire claims that transparency does not promote 'positive' norms and trust. She argues that as transparency assumes that individuals are calculating and opportunistic, it constrains individual's freedoms. This consequently means that no responsibility can be fostered between government and society. This contradicts the views of Kolstad and Wiig who claim that transparency does promote 'positive' norms and trust. To them, information symmetry allows actors to cooperate with each other, fostering trust and a sense of responsibility to each other. By using Mozambique and corruption in its extractive industries as a case study, this chapter found that transparency neither promotes 'positive' norms nor trust. This is in line with the arguments presented by Bessire. On the one hand, information symmetry does allow civil society to discipline government behaviour which limits corruption. However, on the other hand, this reinforces the view that transparency assumes that individuals are calculating and opportunistic. The change in behaviour does not necessarily change the norms found in corruption culture. Rather, behaviour changes because of fear of punishments. Normatively, officials do not bind themselves to the 'positive' norms. As a consequence, corruption culture is not eradicated and individuals are likely to seek new avenues through which they can act in a corrupt manner. Moreover, as transparency is linked with surveillance, it is likely to foster suspicion rather than trust. By constraining an individual's freedom to choose, individuals are less likely to care for other's freedoms. Here, a sense of responsibility is not fostered.

Despite this, transparency remains a useful institutional design for fighting corruption.

It makes officials more accountable to civil society and corruption riskier. In order to change corruption culture, transparency initiatives should be complimented by other policy initiatives, such as reform in education and the media. These differ from transparency initiatives as they primarily focus on changing norms, which consequently influences behaviour. Mozambican society must develop critical thinking, essential to establishing 'positive' norms. Critical thinking highlights the importance of personal choice, and that individuals should normatively bind themselves to moral codes. Moreover, emphasis should be on creating unity within Mozambique. Stressing common identities and developing a common language induces 'positive' norms such as a sense of responsibility.

The chapter's conclusion has numerous implications. First, it shows how more attention needs to be paid to the limitations of transparency. For example, more research should be conducted questioning whether transparency is a western concept. By viewing transparency as a concept which may be foreign to some, it becomes a contested. Implementing transparency in countries where it may not be well suited, extra bureaucratic hurdles may cause more problems. Secondly, the chapter hints at the dangers of implementing transparency in weak democracies. If democratic institutions and cultures are not present, then the effects of transparency are limited. In extractive industries, transparency initiatives should focus on more than just, for example, revenues. This is counter-productive as it will promote actors to look for different avenues of corruption. In order to address corruption culture more must be done to change the culture. The suggested policy alternatives are but a few examples of what could be done. Third, the chapter hopes to have made the notion of corruption more salient. Although Mozambique is used as a case study, corruption is found in all corners of the world. Indeed, established democratic states such as Italy also rank high[12] on the Corruption Perception Index. Moreover, focus should not only be on extractive industries, but on all sectors which have an impact on welfare. Returning to Dahl's criteria, it should be the citizens who are at the heart of any utopian democracy and therefore all forms of corruption should be fought.

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12   Italy ranked 69th with an index of 3.9 (Transparency, 2012).

Annexes

Annex 1: Geographic map of Mozambique
(Source: Population Data, 2012).

Annex 2: Questions to the Centro De Integridade Publica

Question: How transparent do you see the Mozambican government today?

Answer: The Mozambican government has big problems to disclose its activities and share with the public. Particularly in cases that have direct influence in the providing of good means of life, so that people can enjoy a fairly satisfiable life. This happen also because the law doesn't outline what is confidential and what is secret information subject only to use by the government. Other problems occur because we don't have legal mechanisms to force our government to share information. In this very moment we have a draft law on access to information deposited in the parliament for at least than 10 years. This is the big obstacle to information access for people and an artifice for government self-defense to keep in secrecy its activities.

We are expecting that this law proposal on information access will be approved as soon as possible; to allow people's access to information in possession of the government mainly in cases were this can help or facilitate their lives.

The government action is driven secretly in the same aspects as in contracts with multinational companies working in the extractive industries, in cases such as dealing with research on corruption: as an exhibit, Mozambican government commissioned perception study on corruption incidence in 2010 – 2011, but its results are not published yet, against government's own planning). To summarize it, it operates in secrecy in cases were it is mandatory to clarify the people on the benefits our government received for contracts signed with many parts, including other Governments, companies, private institutions, etc.

The current "secret actions" are the key measures of our government performance. But, in the same aspects, we have things that are beginning to change, for instance in transparency initiative for extractive industries, that the government is doing all formal efforts to adhere international standards

Question: How strong is the civil society in Mozambique?

Answer: Civil society actions in Mozambique are very weak, particularly in governance area. Basically organizations are working in areas where the confrontation with the government does not exist.

I am talking about areas such as public policies monitoring, accountability and others, where we have few organizations working in.

The laws allows for civil society to develop activities in all kinds of areas. Mozambican government created also spaces for participation in government process. For instance: Observatório de Desenvolvimento (development watch), Revisão Anual (annual review) and other distrital forum, etc...

The biggest problems are related with the fact that many organizations are allied with the government in their actions, and then never go against government policies when these are wrong. In other cases, civil society organizations don't use these spaces to monitoring government activities, because of that, with or without their participation, the government policies not change.

Question: How engaged would you say that the Mozambican society is in surveying its government?

Answer: Mozambican Civil Society is not enough engaged to follow the government activities. This is symptomatic because their actions are conducted to non-public policies, but first of all to guarantee funds to conduct their activities. The easiest way to get this, is to align their activities with governments' plans and not contradict/confront when the government has any wrongdoings.

The geography issues are one big issue too, because people have a legitimate tendency to think that the south is most privileged than the north. People support this because south of the country has more and sophisticated infrastructures and enjoys better foreign investments. In other hand, people think that this situation is created because most government members come from south of the country. The persons who live on north also think that the south government does not wish to develop their region.

(Centro De Integridade Publica, 2012)

Annex 3: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2010/11

Perceptions of Corruption

Question: In the past three years, how has the level of corruption in this country changed?

Decreased (%)	Same (%)	Increased (%)
21	23	56

Question: To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in his country to be affected by corruption? (1 – not at all corrupt, 5 – extremely corrupt)

Political Parties	Parliament	Police	Business	Media	Public Officials
3,5	2,9	4,3	2,6	2,0	3,7

Judiciary	NGO	Religious bodies	Military	Education
2,7	1,9	2,3	2,7	3,9

Question: How would you assess you current government's actions in the fight against corruption?

Ineffective (%)	Neither (%)	Effective (%)
41	27	32

% of People viewing each of the 11 institutions as corrupt or extremely corrupt

Political Parties	Parliament	Police	Business	Media	Public Officials
54%	35%	81%	23%	14%	58%

Judiciary	NGO	Religious bodies	Military	Education
29%	12%	20%	34%	67%

Perceptions of corruption in Public Institutions (1 – not at all corrupt, 5 – extremely corrupt)

Global	Mozambique
3,3	3,4

Experiences of Corruption

% of people that have paid a bribe in the last 12 months

Global	Mozambique
24%	68%

% of people that have paid a bribe to each of the 9 institutions/contact rates in (%)

Education	Judiciary	Medical Services	Police	Registry and Permit services
35%	32%	39%	48%	35%
81%	20%	83%	46%	49%

Utilities	Tax revenue	Land Services	Customs
21%	9%	22%	33%
80%	50%	40%	25%

Reasons given for last bribe

Speed things up	Avoid a problem with the authorities	Receive a service entitled to	Don't remember	Don't know
61%	23%	13%	2%	1%

Fighting Corruption

Which institution is most trusted in fighting corruption?

Covernment Leaders	Business/ Private sector	NGOs	Media	International Organisations	Nobody
21%	9%	18%	24%	18%	11%

Getting Involved

% of people that think that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption (agree or strongly agree)

Global	Mozambique
70%	82%

% of people that would support a colleague or friend in the fight against corruption (agree to strongly agree to support)

Global	Mozambique
82%	91%

% of people that imagine themselves getting involved in the fight against corruption (agree or strongly agree)

Global	Mozambique
68%	86%

% of people that would report an incident of corruption

Global	Mozambique
75%	82%

Getting involved, by type of involvement

Ordinary People	Support colleague of friend	Imagine getting involved	Would report an incident
82%	91%	86%	82%

(Source: Transparency International, 2012).

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