The EU Common Position on Arms Export Policies – Europeanising Transparency?

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Introduction

In 2008, as a response to several scandals in arms exports, the EU Member States adopted a legally binding Council Common Position on Arms Exports in order to avoid the export of armaments to crisis regions. The adoption succeeded a Code of Conduct from 1998, the first detailed agreement in the field of arms deliveries between EU governments, and pushed for further harmonisation in the field of European arms export policies. The Member States emphasize the importance of such efforts and push for the adoption of common rules on the European level. However, it remains to be seen whether the implementation on the national level is successful. Another important aspect in the domain of arms exports is transparency both in the licensing process and the assessment of licensing decisions. To increase this transparency on a European and national level, harmonisation efforts were introduced through the Code of Conduct and Common Position.

Although the Member States are legally obliged to report to the EU on their arms transfers since 2008, the implementation of the criteria set out in the EU Common Position remains in the hands of Member States. This raises the question, which impact the development of the EU Common Position has had domestically. Therefore, this chapter sets out to analyse to what extent the Common Position has harmonized the national policies in the field of arms export and has made them more transparent to the wider public and different public actors. Moreover, it will be investigated how different Member States are influencing the development of the EU Code of Conduct.

In order to answer these questions, the chapter will look at the Member States implementation of transparency in their arms export policies. It will thus, use Hagelin's conception of transparency as the release of information by those who have it at their disposal, in our case national governments (Hagelin et al., p.2006, p.245). It is necessary that information is not only provided within the government or between national

governments, but the representative institutions, the media and the public in general need to have access to information on the arms life cycle. Openness beyond intra- and inter-government information exchange is regarded as a precondition for democratic control and accountability going hand in hand with legitimacy of governments in the national and international arena. In short, "accountability is democracy, transparency is security" (ibid., p.245). In this context, transparency has a number of different features, which together determine the overall level of transparency. Those features include availability (ease of access and timeliness), reliability (confidence in the accuracy and validity of information), comprehensiveness (type, quantity and coverage of information), comparability (over time and between countries) and disaggregation (detail of information) (ibid.). Against this backdrop, arms export policies will be defined as the policies that regulate the trade of armament between one country and another.[6] In this chapter, the focus will be limited to the decision-making on granting arms exports licences. From a theoretical perspective the is based on Europeanisation approaches, which describe how European governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them.

The chapter mainly focuses on a qualitative case study comparing the three Member States: Sweden, Germany and the UK. All three countries are in the top ten of the world's largest arms exporters, which makes their contribution to the EU, but also the world, in the field of arms very significant and, therefore, worthwhile analyzing. Furthermore, all three countries had a differing approach to the Europeanisation of arms exports and transparency in the field. This becomes obvious in the ways they pushed for harmonisation on the European level as well as in the implementation of the new policy measures. The analysis itself focuses on the national political frameworks, the structures of policy-making and administration and, finally the impact and outcome of national policies on transparency towards the EU policies and vice versa.

Europeanisation

Europeanisation is a much-debated theory and a vast array of literature has discussed it in the last years. Therefore, the following chapter will only shortly elucidate the main points. According to Börzel (2002), this two-level process is characterized by influences, which work in a bottom-up and a top-down direction. Secondly, the said institutions in turn influence the structures and policies of the Member States

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6   To increase the text flow there will be several synonyms used in this paper. Hence, terms such as arms exports, arms transfers or arms deliveries are used in an equivalent ways.

(p. 193). In the following, the different factors that are relevant for both directions of Europeanisation will be explained and later on considered in the case studies.

The bottom-up direction of Europeanisation

According to Börzel (2002), Member States have different incentives to have their interests included in European policies. The more a policy conforms to national preferences, the lesser are the costs a country experiences when implementing new rules. Furthermore, certain policies entail the risk of competitive disadvantages for domestic industries. This may be the case where domestic producers in a high-regulating country face higher burdens than equivalent industries in low-regulating countries. Finally, European policies can deal with problems which can no longer be dealt with at a domestic level but have to be addressed at the European level due to their cross-border nature (p. 196). In order to evaluate the incentives the countries of the case study might have to influence European arms export policies one therefore has to analyse the national regulations in place.

In order to pursue their aims, Member States can follow three different strategies. Firstly, "pace setters" actively push for certain policies, which represent their national preferences because they have a strong incentive and possess large capacities to make their voice heard. In contrast, 'foot-draggers', who do not have an incentive or the capacity for stricter regulations, try to stop policy initiatives or aim to obtain some compensation. Finally, "fence-sitters" adopt a neutral strategy because they neither have a reason to oppose nor to actively push for a reform (pp.197-208)

In order to evaluate the strategy which the states in our case study adopted, it is, therefore, necessary to investigate in how far the countries actively supported or blocked the adoption of the Common Position and which capacities they had to do so.

The top-down direction of Europeanisation

As soon as new policy measures have been adopted at the European level, they have to be implemented in the Member States. According to Schmidt (2002), the way a measure is implemented is dependent on the character of the new rule. The more specific a rule is with regard to implementation measures, the higher the level of coercion, which comes with it (p. 897). While the Common Position has transformed the former Code of Conduct into a legally binding document, which enhanced the level of coercion, the provisions themselves are still rather vague (Council of the European Union, 2008).

However, this does not explain why Member States implement the same rules in different ways and to a different extent. Such divergence has to be considered with regard to a set of mediating factors, which distinguish the approach of Member States. Firstly, the economic vulnerability decides in how far a Member State sees its competitiveness

threatened. Secondly, the political institutional capacity affects the ability to impose or negotiate change. The factors policy legacies and policy preferences consider in how far a new measure conforms to old policies and preferences respectively and how open a Member State is to new ones. Finally, a country's discourse and its ability to change the perception of the afore-mentioned factors is the last aspect to influence the implementation in a Member State (p. 899). Hence, national policies and legislation, the state of the domestic arms export sector as well as the ability to introduce changes in this field and the prevailing discourse have to be discussed in the case studies.

From a Code of Conduct to a Common Position –

Harmonising Transparency?

Traditionally, arms export policy was dealt with in secrecy behind closed doors and on a purely national level. Since the beginning of the 1990s this changed in Europe due to an increased need for multilateral consultation, coordination and harmonisation (Holm, 2006, p.214). A more globalised and especially europeanised arms industry demanded harmonised export criteria and streamlined control efforts in order to ease cross-border cooperation. Likewise, the end of the Cold War as well as several scandals in the 1980s and 90s brought about a policy shift within European foreign policy accentuating a more ethical stance. Consequently, new legislation was enacted in several European countries. In turn, these countries tried to push for stricter European regulations on arms exports in order to mitigate their competitive disadvantages (Bromley, 2008, pp.5-8).

The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was formally adopted in June 1998 as the first detailed agreement between EU governments in the field of arms exports. It comprised a preamble setting out the main aims and underlying principles of the Code, an elaboration of the criteria in the Code and operative provisions including mechanisms for instance for the exchange of information (Bauer, 2004, p.133). The data provided by the Member States is compiled in an Annual Report and was thought to be treated confidentially. Since 1999, owing to pressure from the European Parliament, NGOs and the 1999 Finnish EU Presidency, the Annual Report is publicly available (Bromley, 2007, p.207). The requirements for the assessment of arms export application are divided into two kinds of criteria: those, which obligate a denial of licences, and those, which have to be taken into consideration leaving open a final decision.

Since the adoption of the Code, it was constantly adjusted to ensure transparency, coherence and effectiveness (Bromley, 2007, p.207). After its first substantial review, the

EU Code was replaced with the legally binding EU Common Position in December 2008. The Common Position established common rules on the control of exports of military technology and equipment introducing several adjustments. From then on, the EU rules were a legal instrument requiring national positions to conform to the common standards (Bromley, 2012, p.4).

Figure 3: The modified criteria of the EU Common Position

Box 1. The criteria of the EU Common Position on arms exports

1. Respect for the international obligations and commitments of member states, in particular the sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.
2. Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.
3. Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.
4. Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
5. National security of member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a member state as well as that of friendly and allied countries.
6. Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and its respect for international law.
7. Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
8. Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.

Source: Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 Dec. 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L335, 8 Dec. 2008.

Source: Bromley (2012, p.4)

Notwithstanding these adjustments, the Common Position still remains very vague. According to Mark Bromley (2011a), it might have had its strongest impact with regard to public and parliamentary transparency instead of harmonising control procedures (p.43). In the last year, both number and detail of European national reports on arms exports were significantly increased. Through the exchange of these reports awareness for the degree of transparency in other Member States is created (Council of the European Union, 2009, pp.101-104).

The effects and consequences of the adoption of common legislation in the field of arms exports are received differently. The Member States often highlight the more restrictive guidelines and policies as an effort to foster the commonly agreed norms. Representatives of the arms industry criticise that their own governments apply the EU criteria stricter than other governments, which is why companies are hampered by a loss of competitiveness. NGOs and academia demand more efforts and fault incoherence in the guidelines (ibid., p.44). Overall, research has emphasised that the Code of Conduct as well as the Common Position did not harmonise guidelines as they leave the guidelines' implementation to the states themselves. In the following case studies on Germany, Sweden and the UK, we will investigate in how far the European harmonisation efforts have impacted transparency in the national guidelines and procedures and to what extent the countries impacted on transparency in the European regulation on arms exports.

Case Studies

In order to figure out how arms export policies are formulated, the following case studies will firstly discuss the respective policy environments as well as the roles and positions of domestic policy stakeholders. Subsequently, the structures f policymaking and administration will be investigated. Finally the impact and the outcome of national positions on transparency towards EU policy and vice versa will be assessed.

Therefore the analysis will take into account the already explained features of availability, reliability, comprehensiveness, comparability and disaggregation as defined by Hagelin et al (2006). It has to be borne in mind that each country has its own, specific set of features and characteristics, as well as different amounts and kinds of information, which are published. Therefore, the case studies could not be completely streamlined. Furthermore, we are aware of the fact that each country is also part of a number of other influential international agreements and export regimes. Due to the scope of this chapter it was not possible to address all of those, so that the focus lies on the European level. Nevertheless, the analysis allows for a sufficient degree of comparability.

Sweden

The Swedish Policy Environment and Domestic Stakeholders

Arms export controls in Sweden date back to the first half of the 20th century when in 1935 one of Europe's first national arms export control regimes was established. The regulations were repeatedly extended and adjusted to contain new groups of weapons. Since 1985, Sweden presents as one of the first European countries reports on the preceding year's activities in the export control sector. Today, the Government Communication on Strategic Export Control reports in detail about the aims and activities of the Swedish regulations and authorities operating in the arms control sector (Swedish Annual Report 2010, p.4).

In virtue of a strong Swedish belief in a univocal national position on external security. During the era of the Cold War, the major political parties as well as the Swedish arms industry agreed on a strong, independent national defence policy. Only a small minority consisting of peace groups and the Communist Party had diverging positions. However, the consensus began to crumble at the end of the 1990s as a result of defence cuts and discrepancies of relating future policies (Davis, 2002). Today it can be observed that the major political parties, both in government and opposition, hold rather similar positions on the regulation of arms exports. The adoption of the EU Common Position is mostly welcomed, albeit stressing that EU regulations do not prevent Sweden from adoption more restrictive policies and guidelines. Most of the major political parties refer to or demand more transparency in the process of granting arms export licences. Whereas the Swedish arms industry is not favouring more transparency and stricter guidelines, smaller opposition parties and the main NGOs even advocate a full halt to arms exports. Hence, it can be assumed that Sweden acts as a proponent of stricter guidelines and transparency in the European harmonisation process, although resistance of the national industry may arise.

The Policy Making and Administration Structures

In Sweden, legislation on arms exports is generally prohibitive. All arms exports are interdicted unless a special export licence is granted (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2010). The Military Equipment Act (1992:1300), the Military Equipment Ordinance (1992:1303) and the Dual-Use Products and Technical Assistance Act (2000:1064) govern the regulation of arms exports licensing, which is conducted by the responsible government agencies, namely the Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls (ISP) and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM). The EU Common Position is implemented simultaneously with the Swedish guidelines (Swedish Annual Report 2010, p.86). In reference to the Common Position, the Swedish government states that it depicts "the lowest common denominator in the EU in the area of export controls" (Ministry for Foreign

Affairs, 2010). As each country should be able to implement more restrictive measures with regard to arms exports control, it is suggested that Sweden is in favour of stricter policies.

The criteria applied during the licensing process were established through government practice and are set out in the Government Guidelines for the Exportation of Military Equipment and Other Forms of Collaboration Abroad (Annual Swedish Report 2010, p.85). In general, export applications are dealt with on a case-by-case basis as Swedish export controls do not employ a system of country lists (ibid. p.26). The ISP is Sweden's central administrative authority for the control of the production and export of military equipment under the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) and the Dual-use Products and Technical Assistance Act (2000:1064). If special expertise or information is required, specialised agencies and centres assist the ISP (Annual Swedish Report 2010, p.16). Three councils oversee and support the work of the ISP. One of those is the Export Control Council (ECC), which consists of representatives of all parliamentary parties as well as representatives of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence (Swedish Annual Report 2009, p.19). Its members have unrestricted access to the documentation of all export licence application proceedings. In order to establish further licensing guidelines for the ISP, the Council strives to interpret the national Swedish guidelines and the EU's Common Position (Swedish Annual Report 2009, pp. 19-20).

Europeanisation of Sweden's Transparency

Nationally and internationally, Sweden aims at putting a lot of emphasis on transparent handling of arms exports controls. Each year it publishes a government communication titled „Strategic Export Controls – Military Equipment and Dual-use products". The report is published in Swedish and English and available on *www.regeringen.se* and *www.isp.se* (Swedish Annual Report 2010 p.7). The report is published in a timely manner and can be assumed to provide valid information as it is provided by the government. Over time, both comprehensiveness and disaggregation of the national report were increased as more information was added and the presentation of data was improved. Furthermore, the website of the ISP displays a strong effort to provide both companies and citizens with clear guidelines and instructions regarding the current export control regime.

At the European level Sweden pushes for more transparency and more detailed statistics to be presented in the annual reports. Sweden's capacities ranged from participating in policy-drafting working groups to holding the Council Presidency in 2001 and 2009. These capacities were mainly used to promote more extensive provisions of information on the different arms export matters increased information exchange among Member States, a common legislation in the field, a harmonised interpretation of the export control criteria and the spread of information about the EU Common Position abroad.

From the perspective of a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation, Sweden could be termed a "pace-setter". With regard to compliance to the EU Common Position it nevertheless needs to be mentioned that Sweden, as revealed by the latest scandals, needs to work on the transparent application of the criteria it promoted and claimed to embrace in its control procedures. From a top-down perspective to Europeanisation it is rather unlikely that the harmonised EU efforts on arms exports control increased transparency in the Swedish arms export controls regulation and procedures. Since Sweden was engaged in many drafting and clarifying activities and already introduced intensive adjustments to increase transparency with the change of government in 2006, the adoption of the EU Common Position in 2008 had a rather limited effect on Swedish national regulation and procedures. This is underlined, as there were no major adjustments mentioned in the reports on 2008, 2009 and 2010.

Germany

The Policy Environment and Domestic Policy Stakeholders

Due to Germany's past closely connected with the Second World War, it was lagging behind other European countries regarding arms producing and exports until the 1960s when it started entering the market (Davis, 2002). Consequently, it was ranked as the world's fifth-largest arms exporter during the period 1990-1996 (SIPRI, 2011). However, its arms export regime was rather weak due to an ongoing process, which involved a large number of stakeholders with differing interests. An emphasis on more restrictive policies and a new administrative regime was only introduced under Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Germany's export control regime was transformed from „one of the weakest to one of the strongest" (Davis 2002 p.184). Thenceforward, they centred on the EU's Code of Conduct, which formed an integral part of Germany's principles. However, for the most part the German guidelines were still somewhat stricter than the EU's general rules.

Today, the party political picture in Germany is not very coherent with regard to exports control. While all parties proclaim the disarmament of Germany or even the world, the current government parties balance the relevance of economic political side against those of the fundamental human rights. Thereby, they decrease the importance of the concept of transparency by deciding in favour of the economic political arguments. The parties situated in the opposition of the current government, however, are proponents of the concept of transparency because of their pleading to take into account the parliament's voice while deciding on arms export matters.

This reform would make the administrative structure of the realm open to more agencies. Moreover, the parliament's involvement in the decision process would guarantee an indirect participation of the wider public, through the representation by the parliamentarians directly elected by the public.

The NGOs which are active in Germany, such as the Bonn International Centre for Conversation (BICC) and the professional group Arms Export of the Conference Church and Development (GKKE), constantly push for more transparency and would like to restrict or even put a complete ban on arms exports. In contrast, German arms industry strives for less restrictive and less transparent arms export policies, as that ensures bigger sales for their business.

The Policy Making and Administration Structures

The German arms export is regulated by two legal documents, the Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (Weapons of War Control Act, KWKG) and the Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (External Economic Relations Act, AWG). The "Political Principles of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment" as amended in 2000 and the EU's Common Position 2008 constitute the guidelines for the licensing agencies (German Annual Report, 2004). According to the AWG the export of all armaments require an authorization by an official authority. Depending on the character and sensitivity of the export this can be different actors, such as the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWI), the Federal Ministry of Defence or the Federal Security Council. This breakdown of competences both leads to a certain control of power as to a decrease of transparency, as the process and responsibilities are less clear.

Europeanisation of Germany's Transparency

In general Germany, being a high-regulating country, is a strong supporter of harmonisation of the arms policies and was also seen as a 'pace-setters' within the EU. However, it is argued that Germany's regulations have been loosened rather than tightened, as an effect of the introduction of the Common Position (Holm, 2006). While the reports provide comparably detailed information on some categories, it does for example not specify on the reasons due to which a licence was denied. Furthermore, they lack a sufficient degree of timeliness as well as comprehensiveness. A very important issue in the realm of transparency in arms exports controls is the debate on the participation of the Bundestag. While some parties strongly favour its involvement, others, primarily the conservatives and liberals, oppose it due to concerns for security and business concerns.

With regards to the process of Europeanisation it can be said that even though Germany did not upload its regulation it was a strong promoter of strict licensing rules. This was due

to the fact that the German legal framework was more restrictive than those laid down in the Common Position. With the adoption of the Common Position Germany has rather played down its restrictive guidelines. By doing so Germany wanted to avoid placing itself in a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the other EU Member States. Therefore, we could say that the vagueness of the Common Position has missed the aim of increasing the level of transparency in Germany by leaving the interpretation of the criteria, which are in fact obligatory, to the Member States itself. Thus, even though Germany has downloaded the regulations of the Common Position its implementation should be improved in order to increase transparency to the highest level possible. Although the opposition of the government has been pushing for reforms, such as the involvement of the parliament in the decision making process, to increase transparency such efforts are left unsatisfied, because the government can rely on the common European legislation, which has been made obligatory in 2008. Therefore, it can be concluded that the introduction and the adoption of the Common Position has failed to increase the level of transparency within the German regime of arms exports.

The United Kingdom (UK)

The Policy Environment and Domestic Stakeholders

Throughout history, Britain has been an important actor and supplier on the international arms market. After a decrease in exports after the 1950s, it could re-enlarge its share of the world market in the 1980s and was ranked fifth of the suppliers of major conventional weapons from 2005-2009 (Davis, 2002, p.114; Holtom et al., 2012).

The end of the Cold War and a more peaceful world-order led to a general lack of concern and a rather narrow scope of controls. Only after several scandals the debate on controls came into the focus again. Today most parties are generally supportive of strong export policies and harmonization efforts on the European level. The main differences lie in the emphasis which parties put upon commercial interests and in which way they are weighed against ethical or human rights concerns.

Next to political parties, NGOs play a very proactive and prominent role in British arms export policies. The most influential of those established the UK Working Group (UKWG), which is actively involved in the policy process. When the Common Position was negotiated, UKWG and the individual NGOs had played a significant role in promoting the transformation of the Code of Conduct into a legally binding document. Even though they appreciate the UK's policy as strong they still claim that there is a need for improvement with regard to its implementation (Scrutiny Report, 2008; Saferworld 2011). Finally, the defence industry, represented by the ADS Group (Aerospace Defence Security) generally

supports European initiatives to regulate the arms transfers and to offset a potential competitive disadvantage (Cairns, 2012, p.6; ADS 2012).

Overall, transparency itself does not feature significantly in the discourse of most stakeholders. Instead, they usually focus on the restrictiveness or international cooperation. Transparency is rather seen as a concept, which should generally be supported.

Policy Making and Administration Structures

On the national level the UK's legislation on arms transfers is mainly outlined in the Export Control Order 2008 (Business Link, 2011a). In the actual licensing process Britain is relying on a list of consolidated criteria, which are drawn from former national criteria and the EU Code of Conduct. The Consolidated Criteria were introduced in 2000 in order to make the application process more transparent and uniform. Since there had already been a large overlap between both national and European criteria beforehand, the consolidated version appears very similar to the European criteria (Consolidated Criteria, 2000).

The responsible licensing authority is the Export Control Organisation (ECO). It is both responsible for legislating and for administering and issuing licences. Furthermore, the British Parliament has certain scrutiny rights with regard to arms transfer policy. Here, the UK presents a clear exception in the European context. The Parliamentary Committee on Arms Export Control (CAEC) is allowed to scrutinize licensing decisions and policy, while the government is responsible to make as much information as possible available (UK Annual Report, 2010, p.6). This is a feature, which significantly strengthens transparency in the British system as the CAEC can have a significant influence and does not refrain from criticizing licensing decisions or the general export policy. Furthermore, its members usually support more transparency and regularly demand more information or a timelier publication of data.

Europeanisation of British Transparency

On a European level, the UK had achieved a level of transparency, which was the highest in the EU in the early days of national reporting systems. Often it was seen as possible precedent for other countries (Davis, 2002, p.102). At that time, the UK could be defined as a high-regulating country with regard to transparency. Hence, it had a strong incentive to upload its policies to the European level as it feared to face competitive disadvantages through its stricter policy. Furthermore, a large fit between new European policies and the domestic legislation would minimise the costs of adoption for the British government. Accordingly, the government repeatedly stated its intention to pursue other Member States to adopt a similar level of transparency in their arms exports (ibid.).

With the UK taking over the EU presidency in January 1998 the possibility to actively push for the adoption of the Code increased significantly (Davis, 2002, pp.100-1). When the Code was finally adopted in 1998 much of its content reflected the British policies and there was a large overlap between the European and the British criteria. Hence, the British government was rather successful in being a 'pace-setters' and was able to upload many of its preferences. This was also due to the political capacities it possessed thanks to its EU presidency in 1998 and strong domestic support.

Following the adoption of the Code of Conduct, the UK pushed for its transformation into a legally binding Common Position in 2008 (Government Response, 2008, p.19). But due to the large overlap of national and European legislation, the British 2005 Council presidency decreased their initiatives on the European level and developed into the direction of a 'fence-sitter' compared to 1998 (UK Presidency, 2008).

After having considered Britain's role in bottom-up Europeanisation, the character of top-down Europeanisation of the Code of Conduct and Common Position will be assessed in the following. The publication of Annual Reports became statutory in the UK with the adoption of the Export Control Act 2002. Reports were not obligatory under the Code of Conduct, but, nevertheless, it can be expected that the Code had a certain influence on the integration of reports into national law (UK Annual Report, 2002, p.4).

The first Strategic Export Control Annual Report was published in 1997. In 2004, the government began to provide more detailed data in additional quarterly reports, which are also publicly available. All reports are published and available on the website of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). The spread of information over annual and quarterly reports on the one hand allows for more information to be published, even though certain categories of data are still not provided. On the other hand, the information is less consolidated and more difficult to find for users who are new to the topic. In this context it becomes obvious that transparency is not only about the amount of information, which is provided, but also about the way it is presented.

Overall, the European harmonisations efforts do not appear to have had a large impact on British export policies. Due to its active role in drafting the Code of Conduct and the large overlap between European and national policies, Britain did not need to adapt fundamentally to the new policies. Similarly, its more passive 'fence-sitter' role in the adoption process of the Common Position already showed that no large adjustments would be needed after 2008. This is further underlined due to the fact, that no significant changes have been made to the British export control system after the Common Position was introduced.

Conclusion

As it was emphasised traditions regarding arms exports and their controls as well as party positions in Sweden, Germany and the UK vary, whereas the positions of other policy stakeholders such as the arms industry and NGOs rather conform. In general, Sweden, Germany and the UK, all have their own national legislation, which is implemented and applied in parallel with the EU Common Position and Council Regulation No 428/2009 on dual-use products. National authorities conduct the arms export licensing process on a national basis.

In respect of Sweden's, Germany's and the UK's impact on the Europeanisation of transparency in arms export controls we found that all three, at least in the beginning of the Europeanisation process in this field, could be classified as high-regulating countries and 'pace-setters's.

In all countries a strong national legislation with the obligation of strict controls was in place, motivating them to upload their policies with the purpose of minimising adoption costs and avoiding competitive disadvantages at the European level. Although especially Sweden and the UK had used their EU presidencies in 2001 and 1998 to influence the European position on arms export controls according to their preferences, this changed with their second EU presidencies in 2007 and 2005. Both countries did not pay as much attention as they did during their previous presidency to the issue of arms export controls. The topic almost vanished from the UK's agenda in 2005, which is why the country's position developed in the direction of a 'fence-sitter'. The focus of the Swedish presidency in 2007 rather shifted in the direction of the EU's outreach activities in the field. In line with Sweden's drafting activities on the common interpretation of the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct and the Common Position, the country could still be termed a 'pace-setters'.

From a bottom-down perspective to Europeanisation the situation looks different. Although the EU regulations watered down the restrictiveness of arms export controls in Germany, it can be suggested that transparency was increased as the first German report on arms export controls was published in 1999, exactly in the year after the adoption of the Code of Conduct. Equally, the Code seemed to have an influence on the integration of national reports into the British legislation as the publication of annual reports became statutory in 2002. In Sweden, the Europeanisation efforts did not have a significant impact as national reports have been published since 1984 and a government change in 2006 already brought about adjustments to the reporting criteria. As demonstrated in the table below, the length of the reporting tradition allows for drawing conclusions on the timeliness of the reports' publication. The country with the longest publishing tradition needs the least time to publish its information.

Country	SWEDEN	GERMANY	UK
Year of the first report	1984	1999	1996
Timeliness of national annual reports on arms exports in 2009	Less than 3 months	More than 9 months	More than 3 months

Source: SIPRI Factsheet (2011)

However, overall the European harmonisation efforts do not appear to have had a large impact on the countries' export policies. General problems, with regard to in-depth information, the length and comprehensiveness of the reports as well as common interpretation of the Common Position's criteria persist. At this juncture a table included in the SIPRI Factsheet (2011) adds significant inside information.

Figure 8: States reporting on arms brokering

State	Information reported on arms brokering licences issued/arms transfers involving brokers/arms brokering licence denials									Disaggregated by		
	No. of licences	Financial value	Destination	Control list category	Description of goods	No. of items	Type of end-user	Reason for denial	Country of origin	Destination	Control list category	Individual licence
Czech Republic	x/../–	x/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	../../–	–/–/..	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–
France	x/../–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	../../–	–/–/..	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–
Germany	x/../x	x/–/x	x/–/x	x/–/x	x/–/x	x/–/x	x/–/x	../../–	–/–/..	x/–/x	x/–/x	x/–/x
Montenegro	x/../–	x/x/–	x/x/–	x/x/–	x/x/–	x/x/–	–/–/–	../../–	x/x/–	x/x/–	x/x/–	–/–/–
Poland	x/../–	x/–/–	x/–/–	x/–/–	–/–/–	x/–/–	–/–/–	../../–	x/–/..	x/–/–	x/–/–	–/–/–
Romania	x/../x	x/x/–	x/x/x	x/x/x	x/x/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	../../x	x/x/..	x/x/x	x/x/x	–/–/–
Sweden	x/../–	–/–/–	x/–/–	x/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–	../../–	–/–/..	–/–/–	–/–/–	–/–/–
United Kingdom	x/../x	–/–/–	x/–/x	–/–/–	x/–/x	x/–/x	–/–/–	../../–	x/–/..	x/–/x	–/–/–	–/–/–
Reports on brokering licences issued	8 (21%)	5 (13%)	6 (16%)	5 (13%)	4 (11%)	4 (11%)	1 (3%)	..	4 (11%)	5 (13%)	4 (11%)	1 (3%)
Reports on transfers involving brokers	..	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	1 (3%)	0	..	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	0
Reports on brokering licence denials	3 (8%)	1 (3%)	3 (8%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	1 (3%)	1 (3%)	..	3 (8%)	2 (5%)	1 (3%)

x = information included; – = information not included; .. = not applicable.

Source: SIPRI Factsheet (2011)

The table actually emphasises that Germany, the country, which performs rather low on timeliness and publication tradition, provides for the most detailed information in comparison to the UK and Sweden. In contrast, Sweden, which constantly called for transparency and increased information access in the field, scores rather low. Thus the question remains whether it is more desirable to have a transparent process or a transparent outcome of this process.

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