Characteristics of Cartel Ringleaders: An Analysis of EU Commission Decisions


  • Eva van Leur



This descriptive research paper provides an overview of the characteristics of identified cartel ringleaders that operated cartels within the EU between 2000 and 2011. By means of a three-level analysis, concerning general cartel information, types of agreement and the adjustment of imposed fines, the conditions under which a ringleader is likely to be present are examined. The findings suggest that size, the enforcement of cartel rules and the allocation of quantities all have an impact on the existence of a ringleader. Furthermore, fines are higher for ringleaders and the leniency notice is applied more often in cases with an identified ringleader.


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