School Choice: An analysis of the strategic behaviour of students and schools in the student high-school allocation problem
AbstractWe investigate how the one-to-one deferred acceptance algorithm can be used to solve the many-to-one school choice problem. In the first part of the paper we derive the important properties of the one-to-one Deferred Acceptance algorithm. In the second part of the paper, we consider the Deferred Acceptance algorithm for solving the many-to-one school choice problem. Using insights from the first two parts of the paper we show that the Deferred Acceptance algorithm is strategy proof for students, and manipulable by schools under specific conditions.
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