Toward a Consistent Praxis

The Challenge of Self-Reference in Dotson’s Culture of Praxis as a Meta-Standard

Abstract

The institutional culture of academic philosophy is deeply exclusionary. By prioritising "traditional" ways of disciplinary engagement, it excludes diverse practitioners and their perspectives. Kristie Dotson challenges this exclusion by proposing that academic philosophy should adopt the Culture of Praxis, a framework that prioritises diverse philosophical traditions and methods. In this paper, I examine Dotson's claim that the Culture of Praxis should function as a meta-standard - a guiding principle for determining the philosophical legitimacy of some work. I argue that Dotson's formulation is self-contradictory, as it imposes a universal standard while simultaneously advocating for pluralism. To resolve this tension, I explore two alternative readings: distinguishing between first- and second-order claims and interpreting Dotson's proposal as a political rather than philosophical claim. Since such exclusionary practices are not unique to philosophy, the paper contributes to the ongoing debates on diversity in academia. The issues of epistemic authority and legitimacy resonate across the humanities and social sciences.
By critically engaging with Dotson's work, this paper encourages the reader to rethink inclusivity in academic disciplines more broadly.

Keywords: Diversity, academic philosophy, Culture of Justification, Culture of Praxis, meta-standard, self-reference